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Eric Schniter∗, J. Dustin Tracy†, and Vojtěch Zíka‡
July 20, 2022
Abstract
We introduce two sources of uncertainty into credence-goods experiments: 1) diagnostic uncertainty; experts receive a noisy signal of buyer type; 2) service uncertainty; the services do not always work. Both
make detection of dishonesty more difficult. In contrast to hypotheses, we find that uncertainty decreases
dishonesty and increases trust; additionally, ratings do not improve efficiency of the transactions under
uncertainty. Buyers tended to ‘shoot the messenger’ (give low ratings) when the high-need option does
not work due to bad luck, and to give experts the ‘benefit of the doubt’ (high ratings) when the high-need
option may have been intentionally overprovided.
Keywords: Credence Goods, Uncertainty, Principal Agent, Ratings, Experiment
JEL-Codes: D82, L14, L15
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Introduction

Trust and honesty are essential for markets to function; if consumers1 do not trust, they will not enter the
market, forgoing mutually beneficial exchanges. If providers of goods and services are not honest, there is
also an efficiency loss because exchanges occur at a net loss to the consumers, which is usually larger than
the providers’ gain. This might undermine consumers’ trust and deter future exchange. For many goods
and services, provider reputation can ensure high efficiency. Consumers can easily ascertain if the good or
service meets their needs. Any dishonest provider is quickly identified and ostracized. However, in other
situations, it is difficult to judge whether the recommendation we receive from a provider is honest. For
example, we rely on doctors for advice about the best medical treatment. We might know after the advised
treatment that our health improved. Yet, what we do not know is whether a less expensive treatment could
have achieved the same result. Sometimes, it is apparent that the advised service did not achieve the desired
outcome; for instance, after the medical treatment we remain ill. A host of other situations force consumers
who rely on expert advice to select the best product or service despite the difficulty they may have judging
the quality of the advice. The goods and services in such situations, termed credence goods (Darby and
We thank Prithvijit Mukherjee, David Rojo Arjona, Marco Schwartz and session participants at: the 2021 Annual Meeting
of the Austrian Economic Association, the 2020 Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting, and 2019 Economic Science
Association North American Meeting for comments and feedback.
∗ Division of Anthropology, California State University, Fullerton & Economics Science Institute, Chapman University;
eschniter@fullerton.edu
† Division of Health Economics and Policy, Augusta University & Economics Science Institute, Chapman University;
JTracy@Augusta.edu
‡ Jan Evangelista Purkyně University & Economics Science Institute, Chapman University; zika@chapman.edu
1 In this section, we have changed our terminology to “consumer” and “provider”, terms typical to discussion of trade and
markets, rather than “expert” and “buyer”, terms commonly used in credence goods research.
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Karni, 1973), include medical care, car and computer repairs, financial advice, and taxi rides in unfamiliar
places.2
Credence goods research using experiments stemming from Dulleck et al. (2011) is summarized by Kerschbamer and Sutter (2017). However, as Kerschbamer and Sutter (2017) note, experiments have focused on
situations in which uncertainty is not present. By starting with experiments investigating decisions under
certainty, researchers gained insights into the dynamics of these markets. The literature shows that reputation paired with competition and liability (recourse when the service is not adequate) increase honesty and
trust, when there is certainty. However, these markets rarely are characterized by simple, certain solutions.
This is one reason consumers rely on experts’ advice and services. Unfortunately, even honest advice from
an expert can lead to undesirable outcomes.
We contribute to the credence goods literature through an experiment with two sources of uncertainty:
diagnostic uncertainty and service uncertainty. Diagnostic uncertainty is an instance in which an expert
gives advice based on information that might not be correct, so is misleading, albeit unintentionally and
through no fault of their own; e.g., a doctor makes a diagnosis based on a test that is prone to inaccuracy.
Service uncertainty is an instance in which the most appropriate service is not guaranteed to work; e.g., a
doctor recommends a treatment that is known to work only 67% of the time but nonetheless has a net positive
expected benefit. Uncertainty creates plausible deniability (Gillies and Rigdon, 2019) for any expert who
provides dishonest advice, which in turn, limits the disciplining effect of reputation. Rubin and Sheremeta
(2016) find that the introduction of a productivity shock in a principal-agent experiment reduces both wages
and effort. Balafoutas et al. (2020) in a paper contemporaneous to ours, also report on experiments with
diagnostic uncertainty, including a treatment in which the accuracy of the diagnosis is endogenous. To our
knowledge, we are the first experiment with stochastic outcomes for credence goods.
We make an additional contribution to the literature by implementing a ratings-based reputation mechanism,
based on those popular in an exchange market outside the laboratory. Reputation treatments in laboratory
experiments have used fixed buyer-expert pairs: buyers are assigned to an expert only once and then remain
in those pairs. Our design randomly reassigns buyers and experts after each interaction. However, buyers
rate the experts they consult and those ratings are available to future buyers. We allow three ratings:
“satisfied”, “neutral” or “unsatisfied”, which is much like the rating system on eBay. To our knowledge,
we are the first credence good experiment to use a rating system. In theory, if a reputation system worked
perfectly and conveyed an accurate summary of the history, a buyer who saw any rating would make the
same decisions about interactions with the rated expert as would the buyer who made the rating, then ratings
are equivalent to fixed pairs. If the rating system is noisy or used imperfectly, as we expect it will be, the
results would be noisier than results from an experiment with fixed pairs. Bohnet and Huck (2004) found in
a trust game that subjects in the “reputation-stranger” treatment more often trusted and were trustworthy
than subjects in the stranger treatment and less often than in the fixed-pairs treatment. It is also possible
that experts may try to exploit the noise. Dishonest behavior will increase because there is a (perceived)
decrease in the likelihood that the dishonesty will be communicated.
We report results from an online experiment, in which buyers and experts both participate for three rounds.
In each round, buyers were randomly assigned to a need type, either high or low, but were not informed of
their type. If consulted, experts would run a test that provided a signal of the buyer’s type. Experts chose
what advice to give for each signal they could receive. Two types of service were available; one was best
for high-need buyers and one was best for low-need buyers. The service best for high-need buyers earned
the expert more profit; thus, buyer and expert interests were aligned. However, low-need buyers created
conflicted motives for the expert, who could either give honest advice or earn more immediate profit by
giving dishonest advice that the buyer follows. We ran six cells of a 2x2x2 between-subject design, in which
we varied whether experts had reputations and each source of uncertainty, but did not run both types of
uncertainty together. In the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment, the expert received a correct signal about
the buyer’s type only 3/4 of the time (rather than always). In the service uncertainty Treatment, the service
2 Ride-sharing

apps correct for asymmetric information, so with them taxi rides might now be removed from the list.
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only worked 2/3 of the time. In the reputation Treatment, after the buyers were informed of their payment
amounts, they rated their satisfaction with the advice the expert provided using the ratings “satisfied”,
“neutral” or “unsatisfied”. The rating was made available to the buyer who encountered that expert in later
rounds, prior to the buyer making a decision. In the second and third rounds, buyers had the option of not
consulting the expert, but then only received the service best for low-need types. Ratings provide buyers
with the potential to impact the expert’s future profits.
We found, despite the cover provided by uncertainty, which can make dishonesty more profitable, experts
were no more likely to provide dishonest advice to low-need type buyers. Consistent with previous studies,
we found, without uncertainty, experts were more likely to provide dishonest advice when there were no
ratings. Surprisingly, when there was uncertainty, rates of dishonest advice were no higher in treatments
where consumers did not rate experts. Equally surprising is that the lack of ratings did not create any
buyer hesitation; in the first round, before any reputation was formed, there were no statistically significant
differences in advice following. Consultation of experts in the uncertainty conditions was more frequent,
despite that their advice was less informative. In the diagnostic uncertainty conditions, buyers seemed to
give experts the benefit of the doubt; satisfied was the most common rating when low-need buyers selected
high-need service. In the Service Uncertainty Treatment, when the service did not work, buyers tended
to “shoot the messenger” and give the unsatisfied rating for the high-need service but not for the low-need
service. Like other unsatisfactory ratings, they decrease consultation, which led to efficiency loss. Our results
suggest that ratings do not improve outcomes and may worsen them when there is uncertainty.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature and forms hypotheses. The
third section presents our design. The fourth section presents our results. The final section discusses results
and relates them to the literature.

2

Background

While issues arising from exchanges in which both parties do not have the same information have been recognized for centuries (Rowell and Connelly, 2012), Arrow (1963) and Akerlof (1970) are pivotal in theoretical
work on asymmetric information. Arrow (1963) in particular, calls attention to doctors’ conflicting interests
between prescribing treatment that is best for the patients’ health and that is most profitable.
Much work has been done to formalize and expand the theory on asymmetric information, showing how
experts can exploit this asymmetry. Darby and Karni (1973, p. 69) define credence goods to have value
which “cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead, the assessment of their value requires additional costly
information.” In contrast, though experience goods may entail information asymmetry before they are
experienced, after normal use there is no information asymmetry; e.g., we may have to take the waiter’s
advice about the quality of a dish, but as soon as we taste it we know the true quality. Plott and Wilde
(1980) present a model in which consumers facing experts with a conflict of interest search until search cost
exceeds the expected benefit of further search. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that under information
asymmetry unless interests align, the better-informed party will introduce self-serving noise. The signal sent
maximizes the sender’s (expert’s) expected profit, balancing the gains if the receiver (buyer) trusts the signal
against the costs from actions (not) taken when a signal is not trusted. In contrast to previous models, in
which need level could take on any value within a given range, Pitchik and Schotter (1987) present a discrete
model in which need level is either high or low. Most experiments use this binary model. They also argue an
increase in expert certainty, will lead to decrease in honesty, though this depends on heterogeneity of expert
certainty. Wolinsky (1993) posits a model in which expert diagnosis is imperfect. However, in contrast to
how we model uncertainty, in Wolinsky’s model, experts present customers an estimate (of problem size
and thus price). Misdiagnosis does not lead to un-repaired or over-repaired problems, just surprise bills.
Wolinsky’s model also assumes the benefit of service is always great enough to ensure the customer enters
the market. While discussing “reputation”, what Wolinsky (and many others) models is personal history
with an expert, not any capacity to share an opinion about an expert with acquaintances. Bester and Dahm
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(2018) assume diagnosis requires costly and unobservable effort, which contributes to inefficacy. They argue
that accurate buyer reports of the failure of treatment can induce expert honesty if reports of misdiagnosis
imply additional cost to experts. Liu et al. (2019) present a model where expert ability is heterogeneous,
and low ability experts make diagnostic errors but high ability experts do not.
Our review of the related experimental literature on dishonest advice, starts with papers not always cited
in credence good reviews, despite the evidence they provide about when asymmetric information is likely to
be exploited. Plott and Wilde (1982) present evidence that when buyers have uncertainty regarding their
needs, sellers will advise buyers to purchase options that increase the sellers’ profits. Gneezy (2005) finds
evidence of aversion to lying in a sender receiver game; compared to allocations in a binary dictator game,
subjects were less likely to send a deceptive message likely to result in the allocation. Rates of anticipated
and actual advice following were both „80%. As expected, lying was more likely when it was more profitable.
In a 2 x 2 design, Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) vary both the profitability of lying and the option of
a costly punishment in a sender receiver game with repeated rounds and random matching. They find that
punishment does not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of lying but does increase the
likelihood that the receiver ‘trusts’ the message. Rates of lying did not statistically differ depending on
how profitable it was. As expected, subjects punished lying, particularly when they trusted the lie. There
were also fairly frequent rates of punishment when the message was truthful but not trusted, 5% and 13%
depending on the profitability of lying, that the authors attributed to subject error.
The credence goods literature has identified three ways experts can be dishonest: underprovision, in which
a high-need buyer is only provided the low-need remedy; overcharging, in which the buyer is billed for
and allegedly provided the high-need remedy but in reality only provided with the low-need remedy; and
overprovision, in which a low-need buyer is provided the high-need remedy (Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2006). Laboratory experiments have identified important factors in restraining expert dishonesty. Dulleck
et al. (2011) report on a credence goods experiment with 16 treatment cells that vary whether there is
reputation (if sellers have identities rather than being anonymous), competition (if the buyer can choose from
multiple sellers), liability (if the buyer has recourse when underprovision), and verifiability (if overcharging is
possible). They find evidence of overcharging, overprovision, and underprovision, concluding that verifiability
does little to improve efficiency but liability increases efficiency. They report that reputation alone has little
impact aside from when liability and verifiability are absent. Kerschbamer et al. (2017) present evidence
that heterogeneity of social preferences explains why verifiability does not increase efficiency. Beck et al.
(2014) find that, compared to traditional undergraduate students, students training to be car mechanics are
more dishonest in a laboratory credence goods experiment. Bejarano et al. (2017) find that subjects who
select into payment schemes with a conflict of interest3 exhibit more dishonesty as experts.
Field experiments provide expanded insights and show that many of the lab findings generalize. In a
field experiments focused on auto mechanics, Schneider (2012) finds significant levels of both over and
underprovision, and that the suggestion of repeated business did not significantly improve recommendations.
We note that despite the underprovision, the mechanics did not leave much money on the table. Additionally,
Schneider’s (2012) study has relatively few repair shops, and it is not clear what the mechanics believed about
the probability of detection of overprovision. In a field experiment, Balafoutas et al. (2013) find that when the
customer is perceived to be not from the city or country (and less familiar with what route should be taken)
Athens taxi drivers choose a longer, more expensive route, and were more likely to overcharge the customer.
In a related field experiment, Balafoutas et al. (2017) find that “second-degree moral hazard” situations in
which the buyer will be reimbursed for the charges, also increase overcharging. Likewise, Kerschbamer et al.
(2016) find that insurance coverage, which reduces the uncertainty of potential loss for the customer, induces
dishonesty of sellers in credence goods markets. Gottschalk et al. (2020) find that 28% of Swiss dentists
recommended unnecessary fillings; lower-income of patients, shorter waiting times for appointments, and
ownership of the practice were associated with increased likelihood of overprovision.
3 A conflict of interest arises when the expert makes greater profits from particular (credence) goods. These are the case
most often studied but not inherent.
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While reputation in the context of credence goods is generally induced through repeated interactions and
personal history, there is considerable research showing that consumer ratings of sellers can identify lowquality products and discipline dishonest sellers. Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) find that negative feedback on
eBay can have a deleterious impact on a sellers’ future sales. Huck et al. (2010) and Huck and Lünser (2010)
in markets with moral hazard, allow consumers to share information with each other about past experiences
with sellers while varying network structure and group size. Their findings indicate partial information can
be very effective at instilling trust and improving efficiency. Luca (2016) finds that one-star increase in a
seller’s average Yelp review is associated with a 9% increase in revenue. Kerschbamer et al. (2019) find
that better-rated computer shops (according to Google and Yelp! reviews) charged less for the same repair.
They describe the finding as “striking” because all the shops were able to repair the computer, implying that
they view the rating is an indication of quality. We suggest that if ratings are viewed as an indication of
value (quality given the price), the result is much more intuitive. Reimers and Waldfogel (2021) show that
consumer reviews increase total sales and improve consumer welfare. Positive reviews have more impact
than negative reviews suggesting that the availability of reviews increases market participation.
However, there is some reason to question how well consumer ratings will work in credence good markets,
particularly when uncertainty is introduced. Mishel (1988) argues that patients seek out additional information to reduce uncertainty and the anxiety uncertainty produces. Gordon et al. (2000) find that physician
disclosure of uncertainty is associated with higher patient satisfaction, but not the sole determinant. One
possible mechanism is that with disclosure when patients have a bad outcome, they give doctors the benefit
of the doubt. Another mechanism is that patients, who have positive outcomes are relieved they did not
have the negative one so that increases their satisfaction. In contrast, without disclosure patients are less
aware of the potential negative outcome so do not have the same sense of relief. However, all this says is
patients would rather know about the uncertainty when it is present. Presumably, they would also avoid
uncertainty when possible. John et al. (2019) find that people tend to “shoot the messenger” and blame
(dislike) the person who delivers news of a negative event even when the person bears no responsibility for
the negative outcome. They argue it is an attempt to integrate the new event with existing belief systems
and is particularly strong when the event is a surprise or somehow contradicts existing beliefs. Filippas et al.
(2019) show that customer ratings have grown more positive over time, and argue that while there have
been some improvements in quality, the inflation has been driven by an increased cost (feeling bad) of giving
negative feedback.
The credence goods experiment literature has almost entirely relied on experimental designs where the expert
is certain about the value of their credence goods to buyers. Kerschbamer and Sutter (2017, p. 20) conclude,
“[a]nother very important question – according to our opinion – concerns the effects of uncertainty in the
expert’s diagnosis. The laboratory experiments reviewed in this paper were all characterized by the fact
that expert sellers could be expected to diagnose the buyer’s needs with certainty. This is obviously a harsh
assumption that is violated to different degrees in most naturally occurring credence goods markets. The
most prominent example for this claim is most likely the health care market where the diagnosis of a patient’s
needs is very often afflicted by fairly large degrees of uncertainty.” We also identify an additional source of
uncertainty common in credence goods, service uncertainty. Even if a doctor accurately diagnoses a patient
and prescribes appropriate treatment, the treatment may not work for that particular patient. Similarly, a
financial adviser could make a sound investment recommendations that do not deliver the expected returns
because of an unforeseeable market shock.
Our experimental design tests how these two types of uncertainty impact credence goods markets. Our
experimental environment focuses on overprovision. There is no way our experts can overcharge. While,
we allow for underprovision, it decreases expert earnings so do not expect it. Our environment, like those
of Plott and Wilde (1982) and Dulleck et al. (2011), includes a market entry decision and allows buyers
to disregard expert advice. In our design, the low need good is a “do it yourself” (DIY) solution which is
available to the consumer independent of the expert. For example, in the case of a sprained ankle, the expert
medical advice might be to ice it, wrap it in an elastic bandage, and not put weight on it for the recovery
period. Consumers, who are skeptical of medical experts might pursue this treatment without consulting an
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expert. If the injury is more serious (e.g. a torn ligament) and actually requires surgery, the consumers are
worse off because of their skepticism, so more trusting consumers gain peace of mind through consulting, even
if the eventual treatment is DIY. While “commitment” to following advice has been identified as important
to market efficiency (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006), we opted for an environment in which we had both
these measures of consumer trust.

2.1

Model

Our setup is typical of credence good experiments. Subjects are assigned to one of two roles, either “buyer”
or “expert”, which they maintain throughout the experiment. Each round, buyers are assigned a need type
{high, low}; with probability 0 ă p ă 1 they are high need.4 Their type is not revealed to them, but buyers
can seek an expert’s advice. If consulted, experts receive a signal with accuracy (0.5 ă s ď 1) about the
buyer’s type.5 In most experiments thus far, s “ 1. However, we will exogenously vary s.6 Experts then
advise buyers, which service would best serve them. There are two types of services, a less expensive service
which fulfills only the low need with probability q, and a more expensive service which fulfills both needs
with probability q; net of cost, low-need buyers benefit more from the former while high-need buyers benefit
more from the latter. Another innovation of our model is q ă 1.7 The expert earns more from the more
expensive service. In our game: after receiving the low-cost service the buyers are unable to determine if
they would have gotten greater benefit from the high-need service; however, if the low-need buyer purchases
the high-cost service, they pay the cost but do not receive the benefit the high need consumer does, so the
expert’s dishonesty is discovered. Therefore, the experts balance the additional profit from overproviding
against the potential cost of lost future profits if their dishonesty is discovered.
In short, we expand the traditional set up by adding two sources of uncertainty. The first is diagnostic
uncertainty; experts receive a noisy signal of buyer type (s ă 1). The other is service uncertainty; the DIY
and expert services do not always work (q ă 1). Regardless of either uncertainty, expected expert pay for
honest advice is:
«
Et rπs “ pBµpRt q ` Et

ff
´
¯
λpRτ q C ` pBµpRτ q ,

T
ÿ

τ “t`1

where B is the expert’s profit from providing the high need service (relative to proving the low need service),
C is the expert’s profit from being consulted (or providing the low need service), µ is the probability of the
buyer following the expert’s advice, and λ is the probability the buyer consults the expert. Both depend
upon the expert’s reputation, Rτ at time τ .
Expected pay for overprovision is:
«
Et rπs “ BµpRt q ` Et

ff
´
¯
λpRτ q C ` BµpRτ q ,

T
ÿ

τ “t`1

The difference is:
«
∆ Et rπs “ p1 ´ pqBµpRt q ` Et

T
ÿ

ff
´
¯
λp∆Rτ q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆Rτ q ,

(1)

τ “t`1
4p

is bound so the game is not degenerate with the same need type for all buyers.
signal with an accuracy of 0.5 contains no information.
6 Liu et al. (2019) allow the expert to exert costly effort which determines the accuracy. Balafoutas et al. (2020) have a
treatments in which s is endogenous and in which s “ 0.7.
7 We do not vary q across the goods. If we were to vary the probability, we would have q
H ‰ qL .
5A
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where ∆Rτ is the expected change in reputation due to overprovision. Reputation is normalized to the range
(0,1), where 1 is flawless. With each additional interaction expert i’s reputation evolves:
” ´
¯
ErRi,t`1 s “ αRi,t ` p1 ´ αq θ p ` p1 ´ pqp1 ´ qq ` p1 ´ OPi qp1 ´ pqsq
´
¯ı
`ϕ p1 ´ pqp1 ´ sqq ` OPi p1 ´ pqsq ,

(2)

where OPi is the propensity of the expert to overprovide, i.e. intentionally advise low-need buyers to purchase
the high-need good; α, (0,1), is parameter capturing persistence; and θ and ϕ are the respective intensities
(or probabilities) of reward and punishment. If buyers are unwilling to rate experts as highly or harshly
when there is noisy signal (compared to when the signal is pure), 1 ą θ ą ϕ ą 0. If there is no adjustment
in the ratings for the noise then, θ “ 1 and ϕ “ 0. The bracket contains new information. Within it, the
first term are good ratings, and the second are bad ratings. We assume better reputation cannot decrease
the probability of consultation and advice following: λpRq1 ě 0 and µpRq1 ě 0.
If q “ 1 and s “ 1, Equation 2 simplifies to Equation 3:
” ´
¯
ı
ErRi,t`1 s “ αRi,t ` p1 ´ αq θ p ` p1 ´ OPi qp1 ´ pq ` ϕOPi p1 ´ pq .

(3)

Here we expect θ “ 1 and ϕ “ 0, as OPi is a clear indicator of expert honesty. We include them for
consistency with later equations. If there is no overprovision, OPi “ 0, and no adjustment, θ “ 1, the
bracketed term is 1, entirely good reputation. However, if there is overprovision OPi “ 1 and no adjustment
ϕ “ 0, the term is p.
If q “ 1 and s ă 1, Equation 2 simplifies to Equation 4:
”
´
¯
ErRi,t`1 s “ αRi,t ` p1 ´ αq θpp1 ´ sOPi ` p1 ´ sqp1 ´ OPi q `
´
¯´
¯ı
sOPi ` p1 ´ sqp1 ´ OPi q 1 ´ ϕp1 ´ pq .

(4)

If q ă 1 and s “ 1, Equation 2 simplifies to Equation 5:
” ´
¯
ErRi,t`1 s “ αRi,t ` p1 ´ αq θ p ` p1 ´ pqp1 ´ qq ` p1 ´ OPi qp1 ´ pqq

(5)

`ϕOPi p1 ´ pqqs .
Note p1 ´ pqp1 ´ qq of the ratings become favorable (have moved from the second to the first term in the
bracket) because failure of the service obscures overprovision.
Proposition 1: Without reputation payoffs do not provide incentives for honesty.
Proof: Without reputation ∆Rτ is undefined, so Equation 1 reduces to the first term, which
cannot be negative.
In other words, overprovision is expected to increase profit, when there is no reputation, as such we expect
more overprovision in this treatment. We also expect buyers to anticipate this overprovision and to be more
wary of experts.8
Hypothesis 1: The Reputation Treatment (relative to no reputation) will increase the experts’
honesty and the buyers’ trust.
8 Because our experts are in competition against the DIY option, we expect results closer to Dulleck et al.’s (2011) Competition/Reputation Treatment than to their Reputation Treatment. Schneider (2012) also fails to find an effect from reputation.
However, the study had relatively few experts and it was not clear what they believed about the probability of detection of
overprovision.
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To test this hypothesis we will analyze the data for evidence of: a) decreased rates of overprovision, b) increased rates of consultation, c) increased the rates buyers select the high-need service when advised to.
Additionally we expect: d) increased buyers’ welfare (earnings).9
Proposition 2: An increase in the signal quality does not increase the expected reputation
(does not decrease cost) and the payoff of overprovision.
Proof: (from Eq. 4)
B ErRi,t s
“ p1 ´ αq r´θp1 ´ pqs ` ϕp1 ´ pqss .
BOPi
B 2 ErRi,t s
“ p1 ´ αq r´θp1 ´ pq ` ϕp1 ´ pqs .
BsBOPi
0 ď ϕ ă θ ď 1, p ă 1, α ă 1
B 2 ErRi,t s
ď 0.
BsBOPi
If we restrict p ě 0.5a λpRq1 ě 0 and µpRq1 ě 0.
B∆ Erπs
ď0
Bs
a If

p ă 0.5, then honest experts unintentionally recommend increased purchase of the high-need good and thereby decreasing
the relative profit of intentional overprovision, at least for the first (immediate) term; the impact on the second term is negative,
so the overall impact is ambiguous.

Hypothesis 2: The Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment (s ă 1) will (relative to certainty
(s “ 1)) decrease the experts’ honesty and the buyers’ trust.
To test this hypothesis we will analyze the data for evidence of: a) increased rates of overprovision, b) decreased rates of consultation, c) decreased rates of buyers selecting the high-need service when advised to,
and d) decreased likelihood of consultation or advice following conditional on rating seen. Additionally we
expect: e) a reduction in the frequency of experts who overprovide receiving “unsatisified” ratings, and f)
decreased buyers’ welfare (earnings).
Proposition 3: An increase in the probability that service works does not increase expected
reputation (does not decrease reputation cost) and the payoff of overprovision.
Proof: (from Eq. 5)
B ErRi,t s
“ p1 ´ αq r´θp1 ´ pqq ` ϕp1 ´ pqqs
BOPi
B 2 ErRi,t s
“ p1 ´ αq r´θp1 ´ pq ` ϕp1 ´ pqs
BqBOPi
B 2 ErRi,t s
ď0
BqBOPi
B∆ Erπs
ď0
Bq
Hypothesis 3: The Service Uncertainty Treatment (q ă 1) (relative to certainty (q “ 1) will
decrease the experts’ honesty and the buyers’ trust.
9 All

hypotheses are preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=tp4az6.
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To test this hypothesis we will analyze the data for evidence of: a) increased rates of overprovision, b) decreased rates of consultation, c) decreased the rates buyers selected the high-need service when advised to,
and d) decreased likelihood of consultation or advice following conditional on rating seen. Additionally,
we expect it to: e) reduced frequency of experts who overprovide receiving “unsatisified” ratings, and f)
decreased buyers’ welfare (earnings).
Appendix A includes two additional propositions, which we do not test in this paper.

3

Design

Our experiment is between subject and has a 2x2x2 treatment design (though we only run 6 of 8 possible
treatments). There are two uncertainty treatments: Diagnostic Uncertainty and Service Uncertainty; and an
(expert) Reputation Treatment. We do not interact the two uncertainty treatments because theory does not
suggest that the effects would increase or decrease in interaction. In the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment,
participants were told the expert administered a test which was 75% accurate, whereas it was 100% accurate
in the Certainty (baseline) Treatment. In the Service Uncertainty Treatment, the DIY and expert services
only work 66.6% of the time. (They work 100% of the time in baseline.) Supplement S.1 quantifies our
hypotheses for our particular parameters.
In the Reputation Treatment, buyers rate their experience with an expert, and that rating {⌣ Satisfied,
À Neutral, ⌢ Unsatisfied} is seen by the next buyer matched with that expert. Thus a buyer who has
been the victim of overprovision (having followed dishonest advice) can rate their experience with an expert
as unsatisfactory, which will make it less likely that the next buyer assigned to the expert will consult the
expert and thereby negatively impact the expert’s future earnings. We used a three-tier system, because it
allows for a neutral rating and simplifies the interpretation and analysis. All feasible ratings are equal in a
non-optional effort cost, i.e., we make the buyers pick a rating, so do not see why they would not click on
the one that honestly reflected their experience. As the game’s rewards do not offer any monetary gains or
losses for buyers to provide accurate or inaccurate ratings, we believe the setup creates inherent motivations
for accurate ratings. Our experimental design allows us to investigate if these intrinsic incentives impact
ratings: the desire to punish experts who overprovide will lead buyers to negatively rate those experts; and
an aversion to punishing expert who provide honest advice will result in positive ratings. Additionally, we
note that if buyers did not accurately rate experts, then they should expect other buyers to also inaccurately
rate experts, so should disregard ratings when making decisions.
The subjects were recruited by posting the study to Prolific (www.prolific.co), which maintains a database
of people who have volunteered to participate in online research studies. We restricted recruitment to
volunteers residing in the US, and only allowed volunteers to participate in the study once. Prolific notified
potential participants who could read a brief description of the study and then opt to proceed to the study’s
web-based software. Table S.3 reports participant characteristics. Our software was built in PHP. Subjects
were assigned a treatment and a role of either buyer or expert, both of which they maintained for the duration
of the experiment. All participants received instructions (based on feedback in a classroom pilot we included
an option to watch a short, narrated, video version (see Supplement S.3) of the instructions). Participants
took a quiz (see Supplement S.4) to test comprehension before participating in the experiment. They had to
complete the quiz without error to advance to the study. If a participant answered a question(s) incorrectly,
they were given an indication of which question(s) was incorrect and given unlimited chances to provide a
correct answer(s). Participants, who found the quiz too tedious, could choose not to participate and perhaps
return to Prolific to find another paid study.
Experts were asked to make two decisions in the experiment: 1) what advice to give to buyers whose test
indicated low need; 2) what advice to give to buyers whose test indicated high need; with the knowledge that
these decisions would be applied to three rounds of buyers. Strategy method was applied to these decisions,
because it was straightforward, aided in online implementation, and simplified analysis.
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Figure 1: Payouts tables for the Certainty and Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatments.

For each of three rounds, buyers were randomly assigned a need type, high or low with equal probability.
Buyers were randomly assigned to an expert. In the first round, buyers had to consult the expert. In later
rounds, buyers had the option of not consulting and using a do-it-yourself (DIY) service. If buyers consulted,
they saw the advice the expert chose to give buyers with their diagnostic test results. In the Uncertainty
Treatment, there was a random draw to determine if their diagnostic test accurately determined their need
type. After seeing the expert’s advice, buyers made the choice as to whether to buy the expert’s service (or
to use the DIY service). Buyers learned the result of their decision, and then if they consulted the expert
that round and were in the Reputation Treatment, they rated the expert {⌢ Unsatisfied, À Neutral, ⌣
Satisfied}. If buyers did not consult, they could not buy the expert’s service and their only option was the
cheaper DIY alternative. In the second and third rounds, buyers saw the rating that was last given (by
another buyer) to their assigned expert before making any decisions. We only use three possible ratings and
show only the most recent rating to simplify the analysis.
Figure 1 is a screenshot of the payout tables for the Certainty and Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatments. The
upper table provides the story (starting amount, cost of service, benefit of service) to account for the payouts.
The lower table only includes the resulting final payment. We conducted a pilot in one of the authors’ classes
that included a post-experiment class discussion. Students indicated a desire to see the information in both
formats.
Figure 2 is a screenshot of the payout tables for the Service Uncertainty Treatment. As with Figure 1, the
upper table communicates the story. The Service Uncertainty Treatment has two versions of the lower table
one for the cases in which the service works and a second for the cases when it does not work. Payouts are
increased to maintain the same expected benefit (within rounding) of the other treatments. Note that in
contrast to the other treatments when the service does not work it is impossible to detect overprovision.
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Figure 2: Payouts tables for the Service Uncertainty Treatment
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4

Results

The experiment was run from Jan. 27th to Feb. 4th , 2021 on Prolific.co. There were 297 experts and 324
buyers. Experts earned $5.70 and buyers $3.78, including a $1.30 participation fee. Subjects were allowed
20 minutes to complete the experiment.
Average completion times were 9.63 minutes for experts and 10.48 minutes for buyers. The study is exempt
from Institutional Review, because we only had Prolific IDs and never had personal identifiable information
from the subjects. Results of experts’ decisions are presented in the first subsection and results of buyers’
decisions are presented in the second.
We begin with a summary of our findings with regard to our hypotheses, in order to provide the reader with
context for the analyses which substantiates these findings, prior to discussing the details of those analyses.
Finding 1: Consistent with our hypothesis, in the Reputation Treatment, experts were more
honest. However, contrary to our hypothesis, buyers were not less trusting.
Finding 2: Contrary to our hypothesis, in the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment, experts were
no less honest, nor were buyers more trusting.
Finding 3: Contrary to our hypothesis, in the Service Uncertainty Treatment, experts were
no less honest, nor were buyers less trusting.

4.1

Expert decisions

Experts make two decisions: the advice to give to buyers whose test indicates low-need and the advice to give
if to buyers whose test indicates high-need. The latter is trivial (interests are aligned) and can be used as an
attention check for the former. Advising high-need buyers to DIY (which benefits neither party) occurred at
just under 5%, indicating good participant comprehension. In the former, interests are not aligned; experts
can advise buyers to buy their service and increase their own earnings at the expense of buyers. This is
commonly referred to as overprovision. Our analysis of expert decisions focuses on how overprovision is
impacted by uncertainty and reputation. Figure 3 reports rates of overprovision (expert dishonesty) by
treatment.
Table 1: Expert Earnings by Treatment and Over-Provision, Balanced
Rep
0
0
0
1
1
1

ProdUncert
0
0
1
0
0
1

ExpUncert
0
1
0
0
1
0

EcuOver
1.819
2.065
2.214
2.205
1.381
1.773

EcuTruth
1.612
1.719
1.643
1.588
1.464
1.431

LiePay
0.207
0.347
0.571
0.618
-0.084
0.342

Over
0.196
0.120
0.140
0.060
0.078
0.080

Constructed by calculating mean earnings for each treatment arm and buyer need
level, and then taking the mean of means, ensuring equal weight to each need level
in every treatment. LiePay is the difference between the proceeding two columns.

Table 1 reports expert earnings by treatment and overprovision versus truthfully reporting need level, fixing
buyer need type at the expected 50-50 distribution. Overprovision was profitable in all but one treatment,
Diagnostic Uncertainty with Reputation. With the possible exception of the Certainty Treatment, expected
overprovision was more profitable in the no Reputation Treatment.
Within no reputation, dishonesty is more profitable with uncertainty, service uncertainty more so. The final
column reports the proportion of experts who recommended their service to low-need buyers.
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Figure 3: Rates of Overprovision by Treatment

Dashed lines indicate χ2 -test; p-values for the corresponding tests are beside lines. As none of the tests are statistically significant
at conventional levels, we do not correct for multiple hypothesis testing.

In support of Finding 1, as hypothesized, the Reputation Treatment, in which buyers rate experts and can
avoid experts with negative ratings, has lower rates of overprovision than the No Reputation Treatment.
The p-value of a χ2 -test pooling all three cells is 0.045. However, the difference across individual cells is
not statistically significant for p ă 5%. In support of Finding 2, contrary to our hypothesis, differences in
rates of overprovision are not statistically significant between diagnostic uncertainty (where the buyer cannot
distinguish between overprovision and an inaccurate test) and certainty (where the low payout only occurs
when the expert is dishonest). Rates are actually lower when there is no reputation. In support of Finding 3,
contrary to our hypothesis, differences in rates of overprovision are not statistically significant between service
uncertainty (where when the service does not work overprovision is undetectable) and certainty. Rates are
actually lower when there is no reputation.

4.2

Buyer decisions

Buyers make up to three decisions each round. In the first round, buyers must consult and make a decision
about buying without any personal history or rating information. We analyze the first round buying decision
first, then analyze rating decisions, and finally analyze decisions that are impacted by ratings, consultation
and later round buying decisions.
4.2.1

First round buying

Figure 4 reports rates of taking advice to “Buy” by treatment, during Round 1 when there are no ratings.
Dashed lines indicate χ2 -test; p-values for the corresponding tests are beside lines.
Within the first round, contrary to our hypothesis, the Reputation Treatment, in which experts have greater
incentives to be honest, has lower rates of accepting advice to buy than the No Reputation Treatment.
The p-value of a χ2 -test pooling all three cells is 0.003. However, the difference across individual cells is
not statistically significant. These results support the second part of Finding 1. Within the first round,
contrary to our hypothesis, differences in rates of accepting advice to buy are not statistically significant
between diagnostic uncertainty (where the incentives to be honest are weakened by the fact deliberate
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Figure 4: Rates of Taking Round 1 Advice to “Buy” by Treatment

Dashed lines indicate χ2 -test; p-values for the corresponding tests are beside lines.

overprovision cannot be identified) and certainty. These results support the second part of Finding 2.
Within the first round, contrary to our hypothesis, differences in rates of accepting advice to buy are not
statistically significant between service uncertainty (where the incentives to be honest are weakened by the
fact that when the service does not work it obscures overprovision) and certainty. However, the differences
are not statistically significant. These results support the second part of Finding 3.
4.2.2

Ratings

The proportions of each rating {Unsatisfied, Neutral, Satisfied} given by buyers following advice for each
treatment, are displayed in Figure 5. Advice was followed 79% of the time. There are many more Unsatisfied
ratings in Service Uncertainty Treatment than in the other two treatments. Differences between Certainty
and Diagnostic Uncertainty are not statistically significant. To understand what is driving the treatment
differences, we examine within each treatment how ratings varied by outcome.
Figure 6 displays ratings given by buyers following the experts’ advice in the Certainty Treatment. The
ratings, given the outcomes, are much as expected. The majority of buyers, who bought when it was not
in their best interest, and earn 11 ECU, rate the experts, who advised them to do so, negatively. About a
fifth of buyers in this situation rate the experience as neutral; this may indicate confusion or a hesitancy
to punish the experts, who overprovide. The majority of buyers with both the other outcomes rate the
experts who gave them honest advice positively. It is notable that almost a third of the buyers who were
advised to and chose DIY give neutral ratings, while less than a tenth do not give satisfied ratings for High
& Buy. It evidences ratings based on a ‘first-order’ logic rather than a more informative ‘second-order’ logic.
Advising DIY is strong evidence that the expert does not overprovide. (The only exception is if the expert
both underprovides (which is costly to the expert) and also overprovides.) Whereas High & Buy provides
no information; both honest and dishonest experts would offer the same advice.
Figure 7 displays ratings given by buyers following the experts’ advice in the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment. Each bar represents a particular level of earnings (bottom axis) and shows the proportions of each
of the three ratings within that level. Advice and type (if the outcome reveals it) are on top. Buyers who
get 11 ECUs appear to give experts the benefit of doubt that the bad of the outcome is from the test being
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Figure 5: Rating by Treatment
p = 0.736

p < 0.001
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Satisfied
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We omit rating from buyers not following advice because, the relationship
between outcome and rating given should be substantially different depending
upon whether the advice was followed, perhaps being inverse. p-values from
χ2 tests of ratings across treatments are shown above bars. Chi values and
further tests are reported in Table S.5. Table S.4 reports counts.

Figure 6: Rating by Outcome in Certainty Treatment
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Each bar represents a particular level of earnings (bottom axis), and shows
proportions of each of the three ratings within that level. Advice and type (if
the outcome reveals it) are on top. p-values from χ2 tests of ratings across
outcomes are shown above bars. Chi values and the test of the final combination are reported in Table S.7. Table S.6 reports counts.
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wrong rather than the expert’s greed, which would explain the relative lack of Unsatisfied ratings. However,
we expected Neutral ratings would be more common than Satisfied ratings in this situation. Otherwise, the
ratings for given outcomes follow the same pattern as in the Certainty Treatment. p-values from χ2 tests of
ratings across outcomes are shown above bars. Chi values and the test of the final combination are reported
in Table S.9. Table S.8 reports counts.
Figure 7: Rating by Outcome in Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment
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Each bar represents a particular level of earnings (bottom axis) and shows the
proportions of each of the three ratings within that level. Advice, not working,
and type (if the outcome reveals it) are on top. p-values from χ2 tests of
ratings across outcomes are shown above bars. Chi values and the test of the
final combination are reported in Table S.9. Table S.8 reports counts.

Figure 8 displays ratings given by buyers following the experts’ advice in the Service Uncertainty Treatment.
Buyers clearly punish experts with unsatisfied ratings when the service they bought does not work, despite
that whether it worked was entirely random and independent of the expert. Curiously, there is not a similar
punishment when DIY does not work. Surprisingly, we do not see evidence of punishment when low-need
buyers bought the service, i.e., when there was intentional overprovision. Additionally, there are more
unsatisfied ratings when buyers chose DIY.
Table 2 reports estimated marginal effects from an ordered probit regression on the ratings given by buyers
who follow experts’ advice. Table S.12 reports the coefficient estimates and cut points. The first row shows, in
certainty, overprovision is penalized; relative to the reference cell (Certainty Treatment with truthful advice)
⌢ unsatisfied is 71% more likely, while ⌣ satisfied is 67% less likely. Both are statistically significant. The
remaining 4% is accounted for by a decrease in the À neutral ratings. Penalties are less likely (there are
smaller marginal effects) for overprovision in the Diagnostic Uncertainty and Service Uncertainty Treatments
than in the Certainty Treatment. They are also less severe; the statistically significant increase is for the
neutral rating, not unsatisfied. The estimates show that buyers penalize the expert when the service does
not work, despite that this was random and independent of the expert. This confirms what was graphically
depicted in Figure 8.
Consistent with our expectations, when there was diagnostic uncertainty (and it was unclear if overprovision
was deliberate or the result of an inaccurate test) buyers punished overprovision less harshly, reducing the
reliability of ratings. Consistent with our expectations, when there was service uncertainty and the high-need
service did not work, buyers were less likely to give satisfied ratings. Additionally, to our surprise, buyers
were less likely to punish overprovision when the service worked. Both of these reduced the reliability of
ratings.
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Figure 8: Rating by Outcome in Service Uncertainty Treatment
Buy & Not Work DIY & Not Work
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Each bar represents a particular level of earnings (bottom axis) and shows the
proportions of each of the three ratings within that level. Advice, not working,
and type (if the outcome reveals it) are on top. p-values from χ2 tests of
ratings across outcomes are shown above bars. Chi values and the test of the
final combination are reported in Chi values and further tests are reported in
Table S.11. Table S.10 reports counts.

Table 2: Estimated Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Regression on Rating

Certainty Overprovision
Diagnostic Uncertainty & Truthful
Diagnostic Uncertainty & Overprovision
Service Uncertainty & Truthful
Service Uncertainty & Overprovision
Service Fails
Observations

⌢

À

⌣

0.713
(0.165)
0.0104
(0.0229)
0.245
(0.130)
-0.00826
(0.0262)
0.154
(0.0878)
0.269
(0.0365)

-0.0398
(0.116)
0.0150
(0.0326)
0.159
(0.0276)
-0.0125
(0.0404)
0.139
(0.0470)
0.316
(0.0540)

-0.674
(0.0622)
-0.0254
(0.0554)
-0.405
(0.139)
0.0207
(0.0666)
-0.292
(0.131)
-0.585
(0.0751)

327

327

327

The reference cell is the Certainty Treatment with truthful advice (not
overprovision). The Service Fails variable is binary and takes the value 1
when the service does not work. Table S.13 reports marginal effect from
a model without the Service Fails variable. Robust standard errors are
clustered on buyers.
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4.2.3

Consulting

Table 3 reports estimated marginal effects from a probit regression on the likelihood of consulting. There are
no statistically significant differences between consultation rates due to uncertainty or reputation. Buyers in
Certainty & Reputation are 3% less likely to consult relative to the omitted cell (Certainty & No Reputation).
Buyers in Diagnostic Uncertainty & No Reputation are 2% less likely to consult relative to Diagnostic
Uncertainty & Reputation. Buyers in Service Uncertainty & No Reputation are 10% less likely to consult
relative to Service Uncertainty & Reputation. This difference is not statistically significant. The result is
driven by negative ratings after Buy/DIY doesn’t work (see below).
Table 3: Estimated Marginal Effects from Probit Regression of Likelihood to Consult
Consult
Treatment:
Certainty Rep
Diagnostic Uncertainty Rep
Diagnostic Uncertainty No Rep
Service Uncertainty No Rep
Service Uncertainty Rep

-0.0328
-0.0789
-0.0557
-0.0471
-0.150

Observations
Buyers
Log Pseudolikelihood

649
325
-402.2

(0.0725)
(0.0696)
(0.0679)
(0.0668)
(0.0642)

The reference cell is the Certainty Treatment without
Reputation. Robust standard errors are clustered on
buyers.
Table 4 reports estimated marginal effects of how ratings and treatment impact the likelihood of consulting
an expert. In Model 1, ratings seen have the expected impact on consultation. Buyers are 35% more likely to
consult an expert with the rating of “À Neutral” and 61% more likely to consult an expert with the rating of
“⌣ Satisfied”, relative to an expert “⌢ Unsatisfied”. These effects vary slightly across specifications. Model
2 shows that buyers who were unsatisfied with their previous experience are 16% less likely to consult. In
mode1s 3 and 4, like Table 3 diagnostic uncertainty & reputation is not different than certainty & reputation.
Here the Service Uncertainty & Reputation Treatments are also not different, indicating the decrease in
consultation rates for those treatments was due to the decrease in satisfied ratings.
Contrary to our hypothesis, consultation rates do not increase when ratings are displayed and actually
decrease in the Service Uncertainty Treatment, due to negative ratings when the services do not work.
These results further support the second part of Finding 1. Contrary to our hypothesis, the difference
in consultation rates between diagnostic uncertainty (in which inaccurate test results and the increased
likelihood of dishonest experts depreciate the value of advice) and certainty are not statistically significant.
These results further support the second part of Finding 2. Contrary to our hypothesis, consultation rates
do not decrease when there is service uncertainty (relative to service certainty). Contrary to predictions, the
difference in consultation rates between service uncertainty (in which the increased likelihood of dishonest
experts depreciate the value of advice) and certainty is not statistically significant. These results further
support the second part of Finding 3.
Table 5 reports marginal effects of a probit regression testing if there are differences across treatments in how
rating seen impacts likelihood of consulting. While relative to buyers in the Certainty Treatment, buyers
who see an unsatisfied rating in the other treatments are 45% and 28% less likely to consult, none of the
differences are statistically significant. The differences across treatments for the other two ratings are much
smaller ď 7%.
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Table 4: Estimated Marginal Effects of Likelihood to Consult

Rating Seen À
Rating Seen ⌣

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.345
(0.0726)
0.605
(0.0621)

0.318
(0.0765)
0.568
(0.0672)
0.0832
(0.0818)
0.159
(0.0738)

0.363
(0.0730)
0.623
(0.0626)

-0.00375
(0.0661)
0.0519
(0.0656)

0.344
(0.0766)
0.594
(0.0674)
0.113
(0.0864)
0.187
(0.0791)
-0.00354
(0.0646)
0.0788
(0.0659)

325
163
-171.1

325
163
-168.1

Last Rating Given À
Last Rating Given ⌣
Diagnostic Uncertainty
Service Uncertainty
Observations
Buyers
Log Pseudolikelihood

325
163
-171.6

325
163
-169.1

Ratings seen are the expert’s reputation. Last rating given is the
rating that the buyer (that is making the consultation decision)
gave their expert last round or in round 1, if they did not consult
in Round 2. We include them to test how much the buyers’ experiences impact their decisions. The reference cell is an unsatisfied
rating (seen and last given) in the Certainty Treatment. Robust
standard errors are clustered on buyers.

Table 5: Estimated Marginal Effects of Likelihood to Consult by Treatment and Rating Seen
Consult
Diagnostic Uncertainty ⌢
Service Uncertainty ⌢
Certainty À
Diagnostic Uncertainty À
Service Uncertainty À
Certainty ⌣
Diagnostic Uncertainty ⌣
Service Uncertainty ⌣

-0.450
-0.279
0.0137
0.0619
0.0795
0.284
0.304
0.354

Observations
Buyers
Log Pseudolikelihood

325
163
-168.8

(0.239)
(0.238)
(0.238)
(0.244)
(0.249)
(0.241)
(0.235)
(0.234)

The reference cell is an unsatisfied rating in
the Certainty Treatment. Robust standard
errors are clustered on buyers.
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4.2.4

Buying

Table 6 reports marginal effects from probit regressions for rounds when the expert gave the advice to
buy the high-need service. Model 1 only includes Round 1 and shows there are no statistically significant
differences across treatments. The results are similar to the results of χ2 tests in Figure 4. Model 2 includes
all rounds; the estimates are consistent with the previous model. These results provide even more support
for the second part of Findings 1, 2 and 3. Model 3, adds ratings; while there is still no treatment effect,
relative to unsatisfied, neutral and satisfied are statistically significantly more likely to buy the high-need
service.
Table 6: Estimated Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions of Likelihood to Buy

Treatment:
Certainty Reputation
Diagnostic Uncertainty Reputation
Diagnostic Uncertainty No Reputation
Service Uncertainty No Reputation
Service Uncertainty Reputation

(1)
Round 1

(2)
All Rounds

-0.0982
(0.108)
-0.0968
(0.0963)
-0.0528
(0.0902)
0.0920
(0.0703)
-0.0528
(0.0902)

0.0309
(0.0801)
-0.0977
(0.0739)
0.0125
(0.0730)
0.0787
(0.0635)
-0.103
(0.0695)

177

541
268

168
108

-325.1

-96.87

Rating Seen À
Rating Seen ⌣
Observations
Buyers
Likelihood
Pseudo-likelihood

(3)
All Rounds

-0.113
(0.0897)

-0.0556
(0.0968)
0.265
(0.104)
0.532
(0.0955)

-75.84

The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the buyer follows the advice. The
estimates for Diagnostic Uncertainty No Reputation and Service Uncertainty
Reputation are identical because both cells have an identical distribution of outcomes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered by buyer in
Models 2 & 3.
Contrary to our expectations, when there was uncertainty (of either type) and the reliability of ratings was
reduced, the change in the likelihood of consulting or buying given the buyer rating seen was not statistically
significant. Table 7 reports marginal effects for a probit regression testing if there are differences across
treatments in how rating seen impacts the likelihood of buying the high-need service. The reference case is
an Unsatisfied rating in the Certainty Treatment. While relative to buyers who see an unsatisfied rating in
the Certainty Treatment, buyers who see an Unsatisfied rating in the other treatments are 50% and 40%
less likely to consult, none of the differences are statistically significant.
Figure 9 displays mean buyer ECU by treatment. For comparison, if experts were completely trustworthy
(there was no overprovision) and buyers were completely trusting (always consulted and always followed
advice), buyers’ ECUs would be 23; half the buyers would be low type and earn 19 ECUs and the other
half would be high and earn 27. In service uncertainty, a sixth earns 9 another sixth earns 1, a third
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Table 7: Estimated Marginal Effects of Likelihood to Buy by Treatment and Rating Seen
Buy
Diagnostic Uncertainty ⌢
Service Uncertainty ⌢
Certainty À
Diagnostic Uncertainty À
Service Uncertainty À
Certainty ⌣
Diagnostic Uncertainty ⌣
Service Uncertainty ⌣

-0.500
-0.398
0.0961
-0.287
-0.0174
0.150
0.244
0.136

Observations
Buyers
Log Pseudolikelihood

168
108
-92.79

(0.279)
(0.268)
(0.288)
(0.272)
(0.280)
(0.273)
(0.262)
(0.270)

The reference cell is an unsatisfied rating in
the Certainty Treatment. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, and clustered by
buyer.
earns 24 and the final third earns 40. If buyers were completely untrusting, i.e., never bought and did not
consult after the first round, earnings would be 19.67; they would earn 19 in the first round, and 20 (in
expectation) thereafter. Contrary to our expectations, differences in buyer earnings between the Reputation
Treatment (which theoretically increases the cost of expert dishonesty and increases buyer trust) and the No
Reputation Treatment are not statistically significant. Consistent with our expectations, buyers’ ECUs are
lower (statistically significant) with diagnostic uncertainty when there is no reputation. They are also lower
when there is reputation but the difference is not statistically significant. Contrary to our expectations,
buyers’ ECUs are not lower (statistically significant) with service uncertainty.
Figure 10 displays mean expert earnings in ECUs per round by treatment. While none of the cross cell
tests are statistically significant, the overall (all cells pooled) test of reputation is (p-value=0.005). For
comparison, if experts were completely trustworthy and buyers were completely trusting, experts’ ECUs
would be 2; half the buyers would be low type and consult earning the expert 1 ECU and the other half
would be high and buy earning the expert 3. If experts always overprovided and buyers were completely
naive, and always consulted and always bought, earnings would be 3. If buyers completely exited the market
and did not buy and did not consult after the first round, ECUs would be 0.33.
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Figure 9: Mean Buyer ECU by Treatment

Dashed lines show Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and their p-values.

Figure 10: Mean Expert ECUs by Treatment

Dashed lines show Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and their p-values.
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5

Discussion

As one of the first credence good experiments with uncertainty, our results help comprise a foundation to
understand how uncertainty impacts these markets. In summary, we find the experts in the Reputation
Treatment were as expected, more honest. However, we did not observe a parallel increase in buyers’ trust.
In the first round buy decision, buyers followed advice at higher rates in the No Reputation Treatment (than
in the Reputation Treatment). This is surprising because, though the buyers in the Reputation Treatment
did not see a rating to inform their decision, they had the assurance that they could punish the expert if
following the advice led to a negative outcome (and the experts were aware of the possibility of punishment).
Even in later rounds, advice to buy was followed at lower rates in the Reputation Treatment. This rules out
the possibility that buyers were cautious in the first round, but more trusting after ratings were available.
Despite the decreased likelihood of being caught, we find no evidence that either diagnostic or service
uncertainty results in increased dishonesty by experts, nor any decreased trust from buyers. Throughout the
analyses, we find a slightly lower (not statistically significant) consultation rate with diagnostic uncertainty,
which is consistent with the lower value of the information. Ratings were noisy, particularly when there
was uncertainty, so limited the value of reputation. Despite that ratings in the Uncertainty Treatment were
noisier and had less information, they seemed to have no less impact on the next buyer’s consult and buy
decisions.
We conducted our experiment online and included non-student subjects. While there is understandable
skepticism of results from online platforms, and final payments for our study were less than typical lab
experiments; total pay was below the show-up fee for our institution’s lab. However, hourly pay was on
average $59/hour for experts and $36/hour for buyers, so above our lab’s standard and well above Prolific’s
standard. We are confident this incentive level and our comprehension test ensures quality responses. Our
design also includes two measures of participant mistakes. Experts can under-provide service–recommend
DIY to the high-need type. However, this decrease both their own earnings and those of buyer. The rate
of underprovision is less than 5%, so indicates the vast majority of participants were sufficiently attentive.
Similarly, buyers can reject the advice to DIY. Essentially, this is believing the expert was trying to underprovision. Recognizing this as a mistake is k ` 1 order from underproviding and occurs a higher rate but
is still bellow 8%. Our sample size is moderate so might explain the lack of evidence. In the no reputation
conditions, there were lower rates of overprovision, so our data suggest that an increased sample size is more
likely to result in statistical significance of an effect in the opposite direction than predicted. However, within
reputation, it is possible that a larger sample size might result in a statistically significant difference.
Our results regarding reputation are consistent with those of Dulleck et al. (2011) and Schneider (2012).
Our findings are also consistent with Balafoutas et al. (2020), who find that diagnostic uncertainty reduces
efficiency. Our results are also similar to Jin et al. (2021) who find senders do not fully exploit the ability
to withhold information and receivers are “insufficiently skeptical about undisclosed information” (p. 143).
All these papers including ours indicate many people have a “preference for truth-telling” (Abeler et al.,
2019). We, like Deck and Tracy (2020), find that buyers may rely too heavily on ratings when deciding how
much trust to place in experts, despite the limitations of the ratings and failing to utilize other sources of
information. While tentative, our results imply that social norms and concern for a positive self-image may
discipline credence goods experts even when uncertainty obfuscates deception. Our findings also suggest that
while ratings systems are imperfect, and may not flag every bad actor, or properly weigh information–their
mere existence might provide sufficient deterrence of misdeeds.
Several factors may explain our results. With diagnostic uncertainty, when the service failed to work, buyers
seem to give the expert the “benefit of the doubt”; satisfied ratings were more common than neutral ratings
in these situations. This finding is consistent with Filippas et al.’s (2019) assertion that customers eschew
unfavorable ratings to avoid feeling bad for giving negative feedback. It may be possible that a stylization
we made contributed to this reluctance. In order to simplify the design and analysis, we chose to only
display the most recent rating the expert had received. We could have chosen to average all the ratings,
which may decrease the potential for guilty feelings for not giving an expert top ratings. With service
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uncertainty, reputation was detrimental; when service failed, experts, including those who were honest, were
given negative ratings, which then deterred buyers from consulting or receiving services from these experts.
This is consistent with Mukherjee and Tracy (2022), who find that principals adjust agent bonuses on the
basis of the realization of prospects rather than norms regrading prospect selection. This finding is consistent
with John et al.’s (2019) finding that participants “shoot the messenger” and punish the bearers of bad news
for reporting bad outcomes that were determined independent of the messenger. However, when the buyers
chose DIY and it failed, they did not blame the expert. This may be because the expert did not earn any pay
for the choice of DIY, or that the framing gives the buyer agency over the outcome. However, we note that
the expert does not actually have a messenger role. Experts made decision hours before buyers via strategy
method; software simply implement the decisions and reported the earnings. Buyers were not directly told
whether either service did not work, though could infer that from their payout and the payout table(s),
which were visible when they rated the expert. It is possible that greater uncertainty may magnify the
buyer’s sense of need for information and solutions (Mishel, 1988), driving expert consultation, and trust in
expert advice, which offset any discounting. However, our experiment was not designed to detect or isolate
the effect of the potentially competing mechanisms.
Our finding that buyers ratings are driven by the stochasticity in outcomes suggest several directions future
experiments might pursue. Identifying an alternative way to elicit or frame the elicitation of ratings, so that
ratings reflected an experts propensity for honesty rather buyers’ realized earnings is an important area to
explore, because such a rating system could greatly improve efficiency when there is uncertainty in credence
goods markets. Another important expansion would to introduce other ratings system, particularly one that
allowed averaging of ratings, e.g. stars, and expand the number of rounds. It is possible that although many
individual ratings do not provide helpful information and may provide misinformation, that by aggregating
ratings, the system still provide useful guidance.
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A

Additional Propositions

These propositions follow from our model but not tested in this paper.
Proposition 1: An increase in the proportion of high need buyers has an ambiguous effect.
Proof:

B 2 ErRi,t s
“ p1 ´ αq r´θp1 ´ pqsq ` ϕp1 ´ pqsqs
BOPi
B 2 ErRi,t s
“ p1 ´ αq rθsq ´ ϕsqs
BpBOPi
ff
«
T
ÿ
B∆ Erπs
“ ´BµpRt q ´ Et
Cλp∆Rτ qBµp∆Rτ q
Bp
τ “t`1

(6)

The first (immediate) term of Equation 6 is negative; there are fewer low-need buyers to overprovide to, so it is less profitable. The bracketed expected term is positive, less overprovision
results in less damage to reputation and less impact on future profit. In the generic situation,
it is impossible to say which will dominate.
Proposition 2: An increase in the rounds of interaction, T , will not increase the profit from
overprovision.
Proof: (evaluate Equation 1 with an additional round)
«
p1 ´ pqBµpRt q ` Et

T
ÿ

ff
´
¯
λp∆Rτ q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆Rτ q ž

τ “t`1

«
p1 ´ pqBµpRt q ` Et

Tÿ
`1

ff
´
¯
λp∆Rτ q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆Rτ q

τ “t`1

«

T
ÿ

Et

ff
´
¯
λp∆Rτ q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆Rτ q ž

τ “t`1

«

Tÿ
`1

Et

ff
´
¯
λp∆Rτ q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆Rτ q

τ “t`1

Equation 2 does not depend on τ max, all ∆Rτ , τ ď T are equal and cancel:
”
´
ı
0 ž ´ Et λp∆RT `1 q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆RT `1 q
The bracketed term is non-negative because C ą 0, B ą 0 and p, λ and µ are probabilities, so:
”
´
ı
0 ě ´ Et λp∆RT `1 q C ` p1 ´ pqBµp∆RT `1 q
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Supplementary Materials
S.1

Profitability of Overprovision

This subsection calculates the expected profit from overprovision relative to honest advice, for our parameters.
As in the main text, C is profit if the buyer consults. B is profit if the buyer buys. λ and µ are the expert’s
respective beliefs about probability the buyer will consult, and buy the expert’s service if advised. The
subscript 0 denotes when there is no reputation, i.e., round 1, a denotes events after the expert has been
caught in lying to a buyer, and ‘ is when the expert has not been caught in lie (or is honest).
S.1.1

Certainty

In the certainty cells, the experts receive a precise signal of buyer type, and services always work without
fail, so expert dishonesty is the only reasons buyers following expert advice would not get the best outcome
possible given their type.
Extension 1: Given C “ 1, B “ 3 and T “ 3 rounds, Proposition 1 can extended to calculate
the net profit from overprovision.
ErπpLieq ´ πpT ruthqs “ Er∆s “ 10pλa ´ λ‘ q ` 12µ0 ` 30µa ´ 6µ‘

(S.2)

Proof: Table S.1 reports the expected profit from overprovision, the expected profit of honesty,
and their difference, when there is certainty and reputation. The first column reports the
sequence of realizations of need types for the buyers matched to the expert (1 indicates high
need). This sequence will determine when and if a lie is caught, as well as the resulting loss of
revenues. Each sequence is equally likely (for simplicity we have dropped the 0.125ˆ term from
the next three columns). The second column report expected profits from lying, the third from
telling the truth, and the fourth is the their difference.a The final row is the sum (expected
value ˆ8) of all the other rows.
a For example, in the first row, a lie will be caught in the first round, so the cost of the lie is the difference in the likelihood of
being consulted with positive versus negative reputation; while the benefit is one round of the likelihood of the buyer purchasing
when there is no reputation rating plus two rounds of the likelihood of the buyer buying when reputation is negative. (In this
sequence, the honest expert would never earn profit from the buyer purchasing the service.) Whereas in the sixth row, the lie
is not caught until the second round and the dishonest expert incurs the costs for both differences in consulting and buying
likelihoods, albeit for only one round.

Table S.1: Expected Profit of Overprovision versus Honesty by Realization of Type (Certainty)
High

πpLieq

πpTruthq

∆π

0,0,0
0,0,1
0,1,0
0,1,1

µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B

0 ` 2λ‘ C
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa qB
2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa ´ µ‘ qB
2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa ´ µ‘ qB
2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa ´ 2µ‘ qB

1,0,0
1,0,1
1,1,0
1,1,1

µ0 B ` pλ‘ ` λa qC ` pµ‘ ` µa qB
µ0 B ` pλ‘ ` λa qC ` pµ‘ ` µa qB
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

pµa ´ µ‘ qC ` pµ‘ ` µa qB
pµa ´ µ‘ qC ` µa B
µ‘ B
0

ř

p10λa ` 6λ‘ qC`
p8µ0 ` 10µa ` 6µ‘ qB

16λ‘ C`
p4µ0 ` 8µ‘ qB

10pλa ´ λ‘ qC`
p4µ0 ` 10µa ´ 2µ‘ qB

Case 1: In certainty, the profitability of overprovision depends on the experts beliefs about
the impact of reputation.
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Proof: If an expert believes reputation has the maximum impact i.e. experts who have a
positive (negative) reputation are always (never) consulted and their advice is always (never)
followed, λ‘ “ µ‘ “ 1 and λa “ µa “ 0, by Extension 1, and substituting these values into
Equation S.2 expected net profit of lying is:
Er∆s “ 12µ0 ´ 16
Since 0 ď µ0 ď 1, it is unprofitable to
round before there have been ratings.
ratings are less than extreme, e.g. λ‘
provided buyers almost always take the

lie given any belief about the buying rate in the first
However, if the expert believes the consequences of
“ µ‘ “ 0.9 and λa “ µa “ 0.1, lying is profitable
first round advice to buy.a

Er∆s “ 10p.8q ` 12µ0 ` 30p.1q ´ 6p.9q “ 12µ0 ´ 10.4
a Smaller

differences between µ‘ and µa make lying profitable with less extreme assumptions about µ0 .

Case 2: If there is no reputation, overprovision is at least as profitable as honesty.
Proof: Given that there is no opportunity for reputation, rather than λa and λ‘ , there is only
λN . Similarly rather than µ‘ , µa and µ0 , there is only µN .a Equation S.2 simplifies to:
Er∆s “ 36µN
Overprovision is profitable if the probability of buyers purchasing the high-need service when
recommended, µN ą 0. If µN “ 0, the overprovision and honesty are equally profitable.
a We use µ
N rather than µ0 , because a buyers are more likely to consult an expert who does not have a reputation, but they
will be able to rate, than an expert who will never have a rating.

S.1.2

Diagnostic Uncertainty

In diagnostic uncertainty, the experts receive a noisy signal of buyer type, and services work without fail, so
expert dishonesty is NOT the only reason a buyer following expert advice would not get the best outcome
possible given their type.
Case 3: In the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment, @µ0 , Er∆s ą 0, i.e. lying is profitable for
any belief about µ0 .
Proof: Assume a buyer will rate the expert negatively if they buy and do not get the high
payout and positively otherwise, but buyers in subsequent rounds then discount the ratings
to compensate for the known errors in reputation given the uncertainty. Assuming half the
experts lie, only 66% of the experts with a satisfactory rating are actually honest, whereas
33% of those with and an unsatisfactory rating are actually honest.a by Lemma 1 substituting
λ‘ “ µ‘ “ 0.66 and λa “ µa “ 0.33 into Equation S.2 expected net profit of lying is:
Er∆s “ 2.7 ` 12µ0
a The assumption about the dishonesty rate is higher than we expect, but gives reputation the best shot. When the split is
not equal, the base rate drives convergence.
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S.1.3

Service Uncertainty

When the service fails the buyer cannot infer anything about quality of the advice from the expert.
Extension 2: If there is service uncertainty, the expected net profit from overprovision is:
ErπpLieq ´ πpT ruthqs
Er∆s

“
“ 64{9λa ´ 64{9λ‘ ` 108{9µ0 ` 24{9µ‘ ` 192{9µa

(S.3)

Proof: Table S.2 is similar to Table S.1 however is expanded to account for the buyers inability
to make inferences when the service fails. There are multiple rows for each sequence. The first
two sequences each have three rows. Within each sequence, the first row are expected profits
if the expert’s dishonesty is caught in the first round. The second row is the case of the lie
being caught in the second round. The third row is the case that the lie is not caught in the
first two rounds. The Pr() column show the probability of each case within the sequence. Each
sequence still occurs at equal likelihood, and again we drop those probabilities for simplicity.
In later sequences there are fewer rows per sequence, because experts do not lie when high=1,
so cannot be detected in these rounds.
Table S.2: Expected Profit of Overprovision versus Honesty by Realization of Type (Service Uncertainty)
High

Pr()

πpLieq

πpTruthq

∆π

0,0,0
0,0,0
0,0,0

6/9
2/9
1/9

µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` pλ‘ ` λa qC ` pλ‘ ` λa qB
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

0 ` 2λ‘ C
0 ` 2λ‘ C
0 ` 2λ‘ C

2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa qB
pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` µ‘ ` µa qB
pµ0 ` 2µ‘ qB

0,0,1
0,0,1
0,0,1

6/9
2/9
1/9

µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` pλ‘ ` λa qC ` pλ‘ ` λa qB
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B

2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa ´ µ‘ qB
pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` µa qB
pµ0 ` µ‘ qB

0,1,0
0,1,0

6/9
3/9

µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B

2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa ´ µ‘ qB
pµ0 ` µ‘ qB

0,1,1
0,1,1

6/9
3/9

µ0 B ` 2λa C ` 2µa B
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

0 ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B
0 ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

2pλa ´ λ‘ qC ` pµ0 ` 2µa ´ 2µ‘ qB
µ0 B

1,0,0
1,0,0

6/9
3/9

µ0 B ` pλ‘ ` λa qC ` pµ‘ ` µa qB
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C

pµa ´ µ‘ qC ` pµ‘ ` µa qB
2µ‘ B

1,0,1
1,0,1

6/9
3/9

µ0 B ` pλ‘ ` λa qC ` pµ‘ ` µa qB
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B
µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B

pµa ´ µ‘ qC ` µa B
µ‘ B

1,1,0

1

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` µ‘ B

µ‘ B

1,1,1

1

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

µ0 B ` 2λ‘ C ` 2µ‘ B

0

p8µ0 ` 64{9λa ` 80{9λ‘ qB
64{9pλa ` 80{9λ‘ qC

p4µ0 ` 8µ‘ qB`
16µ‘ C

p36{9µ0 ` 8{9µ‘ ` 64{9µa qB`
64{9pλa ´ λ‘ qC

ř

Case 4: Lying is profitable, even if reputation has the maximum impact (λ‘ “ µ‘ “ 1 and
λa “ µa “ 0), with modest beliefs (µ0 ą 0.370) about the buyer’s likelihood of taking advice
from an unrated expert. If ratings do not work as well, lying will be profitable with even lower
values of µ0 .
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Proof: By Extension 2 substituting the values above for the λs and µs into Equation S.3
expected net profit of lying is:
Er∆s “ ´40{9 ` 108{9µ0 ě 0 ñ µ0 ě 40{108

S.2

Participant Characteristics
Table S.3: Participant Characteristics
Age Range
Obs.

18-25
241

26-45
311

46-64
65

Gender
Obs.

Female
0

Male
357

Education
Obs.

Assoc.
0

Bachelor
53

65+
7

Other
250
Some College
206
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Doctor
177

Some HS
23

HS-grad
7

Master
75

S.3

Instructions

Figures S.1 and S.2 are instruction displayed to experts and buyers, respectively.
Figure S.1: Instructions for the Experts (Annotated): sections in red boxes were varied by treatment.
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Figure S.2: Instructions for the Buyers (Annotated): sections in red boxes were varied by treatment.

Participants also had the option of video instructions. Below are links for each treatment cell:
Certainty No Reputation
Certainty Reputation
Diagnostic Uncertainty Reputation
Diagnostic Uncertainty No Reputation
Service Uncertainty No Reputation
Service Uncertainty Reputation

https://lab.cebex.net/chapman21/videos/VideoA.mp4
https://lab.cebex.net/chapman21/videos/VideoB.mp4
https://lab.cebex.net/chapman21/videos/VideoC.mp4
https://lab.cebex.net/chapman21/videos/VideoD.mp4
https://lab.cebex.net/chapman21/videos/VideoE.mp4
https://lab.cebex.net/chapman21/videos/VideoF.mp4
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S.4

Comprehension Check

All participants needed to pass a comprehension check before participating. They had as many chances as
they wanted to answer all the questions correctly. Questions (sets) not answered correctly were highlighted
in red. This particular quiz is for an expert in Service Uncertainty. Only Service Uncertainty had Set 4. The
payouts in the quiz corresponded to those in the subjects’ treatment. buyers’ version of the quiz replaced
“the Buyer" with “you”. The questions were designed to force participants to look at the payout tables,
which were available, and understand that the interests of the two roles are not always aligned.
If a Buyer’s Final Payment is 40 ECU which of the following apply?
(check one from each set)
Set
the
the
the
the

1
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer

Set
the
the
the

2
Buyer was a low need buyer
Buyer was a high need buyer
Buyer could have been either type

Set
the
the
the

3
Buyer made the best choice given their type
Buyer could have made a better purchase choice given their type
Buyer cannot be certain they made the best choice

bought Service
chose DIY
did not consult
could have gotten this result either by buying or through DIY

Set 4
The option the Buyer chose did not WORK
The option the Buyer chose WORKED
If a Buyer’s Final Payment is 1 ECU which of the following apply?
(check one from each set)
Set
the
the
the
the

1
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer

Set
the
the
the

2
Buyer was a low need buyer
Buyer was a high need buyer
Buyer could have been either type

bought Service
chose DIY
did not consult
could have gotten this result either by buying or through DIY

35

Set
the
the
the

3
Buyer made the best choice given their type
Buyer could have made a better purchase choice given their type
Buyer cannot be certain they made the best choice

Set 4
The option the Buyer chose did not WORK
The option the Buyer chose WORKED
If a Buyer’s Final Payment is 24 ECU which of the following apply?
(check one from each set)
Set
the
the
the
the

1
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer

Set
the
the
the

2
Buyer was a low need buyer
Buyer was a high need buyer
Buyer could have been either type

Set
the
the
the

3
Buyer made the best choice given their type
Buyer could have made a better purchase choice given their type
Buyer cannot be certain they made the best choice

bought Service
chose DIY
did not consult
could have gotten this result either by buying or through DIY

Set 4
The option the Buyer chose did not WORK
The option the Buyer chose WORKED
If a Buyer’s Final Payment is 9 ECU which of the following apply?
(check one from each set)
Set
the
the
the
the

1
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer

Set
the
the
the

2
Buyer was a low need buyer
Buyer was a high need buyer
Buyer could have been either type

bought Service
chose DIY
did not consult
could have gotten this result either by buying or through DIY
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Set
the
the
the

3
Buyer made the best choice given their type
Buyer could have made a better purchase choice given their type
Buyer cannot be certain they made the best choice

Set 4
The option the Buyer chose did not WORK
The option the Buyer chose WORKED
The chance that a buyer in the experiment will have high need and would benefit most from Buying Service
is . . .
none (0%)
one quarter (25%)
half (50%)
certain (100%)

A buyer in the experiment will know their own need level before making decision:
True
False
If a buyer intends to choose a “do-it-yourself” (DIY) solution, they are better off not paying to consult the
expert:
True
False
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S.5

Ratings

Table S.4 reports by treatment the number times each rating {⌢ Unsatisfied, À Neutral, ⌣ Satisfied} was
given buy buyers who followed advice.
Table S.4: Ratings Given by Treatment
Unsatisfied
5
7
27

Certainty
Diagnostic Uncertainty
Service Uncertainty

Neutral
25
25
18

Satisfied
86
77
57

Table S.5 reports χ2 test for equal distributions of ratings across all treatment combinations.
Table S.5: χ2 Tests Comparing Rating between Treatments
Statistic

Diagnostic
Uncertainty

Service
Uncertainty

Certainty

χ2
p-value

0.61
=0.736

21.33
<0.001

Diagnostic
Uncertainty

χ2
p-value

15.67
<0.001

Table S.6 reports ratings by the ECU’s the buyer earned through their decisions for buyers following the
experts’ advice in the Certainty Treatment.
Table S.6: Ratings Given by ECU in Certainty Treatment by Buyers who Followed Advice

11 Low & Buy
19 DIY
27 High & Buy

Unsatisfied
4
0
1

Neutral
1
20
4

Satisfied
0
41
45

Table S.7 reports χ2 test for equal distributions of ratings across all earning combinations within the Certainty
Treatment.
Table S.7: χ2 Tests Comparing Rating between Outcomes
Statistic
2

Low & Buy

χ
p-value

DIY

χ2
p-value

DIY

High & Buy

52.4
<0.001

35.64
<0.001
10.87
=0.004

Table S.8 reports ratings by the ECU’s the buyer earned through their decisions for buyers following the
experts’ advice in the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment.
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Table S.8: Ratings Given by ECU in Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment by Buyers who Followed Advice
Unsatisfied
5
1
1

11 Low & Buy
19 DIY
27 High & Buy

Neutral
3
18
4

Satisfied
6
39
32

Table S.9 reports χ2 test for equal distributions of ratings across all earning combinations within the Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment.
Table S.9: χ2 Tests Comparing Rating between Outcomes
Statistic
2

Low & Buy

χ
p-value

DIY

χ2
p-value

DIY

High & Buy

17.07
<0.001

12.84
=0.002
5.21
=0.074

Table S.10 reports ratings by the ECU’s the buyer earned through their decisions for buyers following the
experts’ advice in the Service Uncertainty Treatment.
Table S.10: Ratings Given by ECU in Service Uncertainty Treatment by Buyers who Followed Advice

1 Buy & Not work
9 DIY & Not work
16 Low & Buy
24 DIY
40 High & Buy

Unsatisfied
19
4
0
4
0

Neutral
3
7
2
4
2

Satisfied
0
6
1
20
30

Table S.11 reports χ2 test for equal distributions of ratings across all earning combinations within the Service
Uncertainty Treatment.
Table S.11: χ2 Tests Comparing Rating between Outcomes (Service Uncertainty)
Statistic

DIY & Not Work

Low & Buy

DIY

High & Buy

Buy & Not Work

χ2
p-value

17.02
ă 0.001

13.64
=0.001

29.63
ă 0.001

49.03
ă0.001

DIY & Not Work

χ2
p-value

1.08
=0.584

6.03
=0.049

20.07
ă0.001

Low & Buy

χ2
p-value

4.85
=0.088

4.82
=0.028

DIY

χ2
p-value

6.43
=0.04

Table S.12 reports the coefficient estimates and cut points from ordered probit regressions on the ratings
given by buyers who follow experts’ advice. Lower values indicate less favorable ratings. Errors are clustered
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on buyers. The first model tests how treatment interacts with expert over-provision to impact ratings. Overprovision is penalized but there are smaller penalties (coefficient estimates) when over-provision is interacted
with an indicator for Diagnostic Uncertainty Treatment and none with Service Uncertainty Treatment, than
the Certainty Treatment. There are also lower ratings in service uncertainty, even when experts are truthful.
The second specification adds a variable to indicate that the selected option failed to work. This variable
is negative, showing that buyers penalize the experts when the selection does not work, despite that this
was random and independent of the experts. This explains the negative rating for truthfulness in service
uncertainty. This confirms graphically what Figure 8 shows.
Table S.12: Coefficients Estimates from Ordered Probit Regression on Rating
(1)
Rating
Treatment x Advice:
Certainty Rep ˆ Overprovision
Diagnostic Uncertainty Rep ˆ Truthful
Diagnostic Uncertainty Rep ˆ Overprovision
Service Uncertainty Rep ˆ Truthful
Service Uncertainty Rep ˆ Overprovision
Service Fails

(2)
Rating

-2.666
-0.0926
-1.209
-0.871
-0.901

(0.706)
(0.198)
(0.445)
(0.195)
(0.414)

-2.861
-0.0961
-1.312
0.0828
-0.954
-2.238

(0.791)
(0.211)
(0.488)
(0.270)
(0.408)
(0.381)

cut1
Constant

-1.757

(0.171)

-1.988

(0.212)

cut2
Constant

-0.865

(0.148)

-0.854

(0.162)

sigma2_u
Constant

0.115

(0.138)

0.185

(0.195)

Observations
Number of Buyers
Log Pseudo-Likelihood

327
152
-252.3

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
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327
152
-220.5

Table S.13 reports marginal effect from a model without the Service Fails variable.
Table S.13: Estimated Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Regression on Rating

Certainty Over-Provision
DiagUncert Truthful
DiagUncert Over-Provision
ServUncert Truthful
ServUncert Over-Provision

⌢

À

⌣

0.757
(0.168)
0.00942
(0.0203)
0.254
(0.139)
0.153
(0.0409)
0.161
(0.105)

-0.00770
(0.104)
0.0165
(0.0350)
0.168
(0.0283)
0.143
(0.0287)
0.147
(0.0495)

-0.750
(0.0743)
-0.0259
(0.0553)
-0.422
(0.153)
-0.296
(0.0626)
-0.307
(0.151)

327

327

327

Observations

Clustered robust standard erros in parentheses.
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